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DISCLAIMER
It has already been shown how even in England prior to the Real
Property Limitation Act of 1833 the change from disseisin to adverse
possession had opened up the possibility of the protection of the statute
to many who would not have been classed as disseisors.
2 31 The tenant
pur auter vie who held over after the death of the cestui que vie, the
tenant who attorned to a stranger, the mortgagor or the cestui que trust
who repudiated the mortgagee or the trustee, the co-tenant who retained
all the profits under claim of title, the claimant of an equity of redemp-
tion, would not have been classified as disseisors at least under the older
law,23 2 but were said to be entitled to the benefit of the statute as adverse
possessors. 233 In other cases, as in that of the feoffee who entered
without livery of seisin, the shortcomings of the old disseisin were
obviated by the presumption of a livery after a twenty years of posses-
sion.234 Where there was an attempt to transfer a greater interest
than the tenant had, there might be either a disseisin or a disseisin at
election.235 The effect of the former was to destroy the tenant's inter-
est,236 and to set the statute of limitation operating immediately, while
that of the latter was to transfer such interest as the grantor had
23 7 and
if disseisin at election was to mean what its name implied, to give the
landlord a right to consider the act a disseisin and so a ground for
forfeiture. But disseisin at election was supposed to work in favor
of the owner and not against him, and if would have been anomalous
to have given it the effect of an actual disseisin in cutting off the land-
lord's rights.2 38 The tendency of Lord Mansfield's opinion in Taylor d.
Atkyns v. Horde39 was to give even to the tortious feoffment the effect
of a disseisin at election, and to that extent to cut down the running of
the statute,240 but the possibilities of disseisin at election had not been at
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all well worked out in England at the time of the reform legislation of
1833.
As we have seen, the effect of the Real Property Limitation Act of
1833 was to cut to a minimum the importance of the character in which
the possession had been taken.2 41 Even the tenant at will was to have
the benefit of the statute after a year.24 2 No such drastic changes
in the law were possible by judicial action alone, but the early judges in
the United States applied with a free hand the doctrine that whatever
the effect of one coming in by title might have on disseisin, it did not
prevent his becoming an adverse possessor. The presumption in such
a case was against adverse possession, but this might be overcome by a
repudiation of the title under which the possession had been taken and
an adverse claim of title brought home to the other party. The new
doctrine hardly had a chance to get started in England but in the United
States it flourished and still continues to do so. The cases of the cestui
que trust against his trustee, or the mortgagor against the mortgagee,
and of one co-tenant against another have already been mentioned. 243
It has also been applied to the case of the trustee against the cestui que
trust, of the licensee against the licensor, of the agent against his
principal, of the grantor against his grantee, of the vendee under an
executory contract against his vendor, of the surviving spouse against
the heirs, and of the parent against his child and to many other particu-
lar relations.2 44 Perhaps its most interesting development has occurred
in the case of landlord and tenant, or, more broadly, as between the
holder of a particular estate and the reversioner or remainderman.
Coke laid it down that there might be forfeiture of a particular estate
by the alienation of the tenant in two ways, either by act in pais, or by
matter of record.2 5  The act in pais which he had in mind was the
tortious feoffment, and the matter of record, the tortious" fine or
recovery. The tenant might also forfeit his estate by matter of record
if he claimed a greater estate than he ought, or affirmed the reversion or
remainder to be in a stranger.2 46 Attornment in pas to a stranger was
not sufficient to cause a forfeiture and the claim of a greater estate had
to be in a court of record.2 47 Disclaimer by matter of record is still
giv¢en as a ground for the forfeiture of particular estates in England,24 8
but the great development since Coke's time of the doctrine that the
tenant is estopped to deny the landlord's title2 49 and the abolition of the
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old real actions from which his examples were taken have left little
chance for its application. There is considerable law in England on
disclaimer in pais by a tenant from year to year or a tenant at will,
2 5 0
but this has been rather on the ground that it determines the will of the
parties than that of forfeiture.
251
In the United States today, as in England, the occasions for forfeiture
given by Coke are likely to be of infrequent application but forfeiture
for acts in pais has had a development of its own. The leading case
is that of Wllison v. Watkins252 in which it had been held by the lower
court that the tenant and those claiming under him could not gain title
by adverse possession without a relinquishment of possession and a
subsequent re-entry. This was evidently under the rule that one who
had come into possession rightfully with the consent of the owner could
not be a disseisor. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
decision on the ground that the tenant by a repudiation of his tenancy
which is brought home to his landlord forfeits his tenancy and starts
the statute running. The case was probably one of tenancy at will or
from year to year and, if so, the repudiation by the tenant put an end to
the tenancy or to his right to notice and the only real question was as to
whether a change of possession was necessary to start the statute run-
ning. But the court was willing to go further than this and apply the
principle to a term for years. This meant forfeiture of a term for
years by an oral disclaimer of the tenancy in pais brought home to the
landlord, and this has generally been accepted in the United States.
-2 5
3
The same principle has been applied where.a termor has attorned to a
stranger in pais and where he has attempted to transfer a greater
interest than his own.254 It has been suggested that the life tenant
should be treated in like fashion,255 but as it is generally agreed that
even if such disclaimer by a life tenant be deemed a cause of forfeiture
it will not set the statute of limitations running once and for all,
256 the
authority is meagre.
It is one thing to hold that these disclaimers may be a cause of for-
feiture and another to hold that they start the statute of limitations
running so as to affect the title. In the ordinary case of express condi-
tions, their breach will give rise to a forfeiture if the landlord so elects
but the particular estate is rendered voidable but not void by the breach,
and the only effect of the statute of limitation is to cut off the landlord's
right to enforce the condition.
257  The case of the tortious feoffment
Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, 451.
' Doe d. Graves v. Wells (1839, Q. B.) ro Ad. & E. 427.
(1830, U. S.) 3 Pet. 43.
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See the cases cited in 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. i92o) 2013 note 36.
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and of the other tortious conveyances was exceptional. In the earlier
law they did not destroy the particular estate.25 It was not such an inno-
vation as at first blush appeared, therefore, when Lord Mansfield seemed
willing to hold the tortious feoffment a mere disseisin at election. To
bring disseisin and disseisin at election into the American development
of the doctrine of disclaimer, however, is to ignore the cause of that
development which has been the application to tenancies of the wide-
spread doctrine of adverse possession noted above, that one who has
come in by title may become an adverse possessor by a repudiation of
that title and a claim of title in himself brought home to the other party.
That is the real significance of Willison v. Watkins, and despite some
statements to the contrary259 it is believed that Willison v. Watkins is
generally law in the United States as far as tenancies for years are
concerned.260  The argument that the landlord may be compelled to
terminate the term in order to save the reversion 2 6 would not seem to
have very much weight. In view of the fact that he is entitled to a
much more explicit notice than is ordinarily required in cases of adverse
possession, his laches in not bringing an action within the statutory
period from the time of receiving notice would seem much more clear
cut than in the ordinary case. If it were a matter of the limitation of
actions alone the running of the statute on one cause of action might
well be held not to affect another cause of action, but if, as has been
argued, adverse possession is really affirmative prescription, anything in
reason that will keep to a minimum the occasions where land will have
to be held longer than for the ordinary statutory period would seem to
be highly desirable. Disabilities and future interests are serious enough
impediments to the quieting of titles to be kept within as narrow bounds
as is reasonably possible.
Much of the above reasoning would seem to be as applicable to the
case of the life estate as to that of the term for years. Certainly it
would seem that a disclaimer should be as much a cause for forfeiture
in the one case as in the other. In the case of the life estate, however,
we have a curious example of arrested development. That the tenant
pur auter vie holding over after the death of the cestui que vie was an
adverse possessor was one of the first manifestations of the new adverse
possession under Lord Mansfield 2 2 and what Lord Mansfield said has
been and still is followed without regard to the subsequent developments
'* See Bordwell, Sesin and Disseisin (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 592, 6o6. The
destruction of the bailment for a term by an unauthorized transfer would not
seem to antedate the nineteenth century.
X2 Reeves, Real Property (19o9) goo; i Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.
1902) 468. The matter is treated as doubtful in the able note to Smith v. Newman
(i9oo) 62 Kan. 318, 62 Pac. IOi, 53 L. R. A. 934, at p. 943.
" See the cases cited by Tiffany, 2 Real Property (2d ed. i92o) 1998 and in the
note, 53 L. R. A. 941 et seq.
=2 Reeves, Real Property (igog) goo.
'Supra p. 145.
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in the United States of adverse possession by disclaimer in the case of
tenancies for years.2 63 The statute is generally treated as running
from the termination of the life estate regardless of express notice to
the one entitled to the next estate and regardless of claim of title on the
part of the one holding over. 21" But if the more exact notice incident
to disclaimer is not to be required as it is of other tenants at sufferance
it would seem at least that the claim of title ordinarily requisite for
adverse possession should be required to set the statute running, and
there is some authority to this effect.2 65 The rule in these cases that
the statute does not commence to run until the termination of the life
estate has sometimes been thought to follow from the fact that the
tortious operation of conveyances has been practically non-existent in
the United States, but while this does mean that the attempted transfer
by the life tenant of a fee is no disseisin there would appear to be no
reason in the nature of things why the transferee should not be an
adverse possessor as much as if his transfeior had been a tenant for
years instead of a freeholder. The very great desirability of this result
in minimizing the number of cases where land must be held beyond the
ordinary statutory period has perhaps led the courts in Nebraska and
Iowa to find a way to apply adverse possession by disclaimer to life
tenancies as well as to terms for years. They have held that the rever-
sioner or remainderman may bring his action to quiet title on a
disclaimer by the tenant notwithstanding the continuance of the particu-
lar estate and that the statute will commence to run once and for all
from the time that notice is brought home to him of that disclaimer.268
This daring bit of judicial legislation has this advantage over the rule
applicable elsewhere to tenancies for years that it does not place the
reversioner in the dilemma of avoiding the particular estate or losing
his fee. The same action that confirms his fee confirms the particular
estate.
To be distinguished from cases of disclaimer are the cases of the oral
or defective grant and of the vendee who has performed the conditions
of his contract necessary to entitle him to a conveyance. In both cases
the possessor is in by the consent of the other party and there was
difficulty in finding him a disseisor. In both cases the older law resorted
to the presumption of a grant to avoid this difficulty. 2 7  But in the
2a2 That in the case of the life estate a disclaimer will not be sufficient to start the
statute running once and for all until the termination of the life estate is
supported by numerous and ever increasing authorities. See the cases cited in 2
Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2012 note 33, 2o13 note 38, and the regularly
recurring cases in Am. Dig., Life Estates, sec. 8.
= See the cases cited in 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. i92o) 2014 note 39.
See the cases cited in ibid. paragraph 2.
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession (1918) 32 HARV. L. REv. 135, 146; 2
Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2013.
'For the case of the feoffment without livery see Rees v. Lloyd (i8r, Exch.)
Wightwick, 123. For the case of one entitled to a conveyance, see i Greenleaf,
Evidence (Lewis's ed. 1899) 46.
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first case at least there is no difficulty in finding him an adverse posses-
sor. 268  In fact his case would seem to be a particularly meritorious one.
In the second case there is the difficulty that the vendee's claim is
equitable and not legal, but he holds as owner even if only as equitable
owner and it is not surprising that the courts have held his possession a
sufficient title without an actual conveyance.2 69  Thus adverse posses-
sion obviates the resort to many of the old presumptions which the
shortcomings of disseisin necessitated. At the present time the impor-
tance of these presumptions as a supplement to adverse possession would
seem fairly negligible.
2 7 0
NATURE OF ESTATE GAINED
The statement that Maitland made of England that every title had its
source in a seisin 71 or in other words was possessory, is by no means
true of the United States. Titles in this country are likely to run
back to a government grant. Notwithstanding this difference, how-
ever, no one is likely to deny that the importance of adverse possession
as a source of title in the United States is very great. And in so far
as it is the source of the title, the title is in general non-derivative or
original. Such in general was the title by disseisin in England. For
instance, the disseisor was not considered to be in under the disseisee
so as to be bound by a trust subject to which the disseisee held
the land even although he had notice of it. There was no privity
between them.
27 2
There is difficulty, however, in thinking of any estate less than a fee
simple as nofi-derivative. This found expression in the rule of com-
mon law pleading that the derivation or commencement of particular
estates had in general to be shown while this was not necessary of
estates in fee simple.273 It also found expression in the general rule
that a disseisin had to be in fee.2 7 4  But that it was not universally true
that a non-derivative title had to be in fee is shown by the case of the
life estate pur auter vie which might be acquired by that most typical
of all methods of original acquisition, occupancy. 27 5 Similarly a particu-
lar estate might be acquired by disseisin or dispossession, according to
Preston, where one entered claiming a particular estate already in
existence, without divesting the estate of the reversioner or remainder-
=2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 2009.
'= Such is the decided weight of authority. See 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed.
192o) 2010; 2 C. J. 154.
" See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (ist ed. I9o5) sec. 2522.
72 Pollock and Maitland, History of the English Law (2d ed. 1899) 46.
' T. Cyprian Williams, Is a Disseisor of Land Bound by Equities Incumbent on
the Disseisee? (19o6) 5i SOL. JouR. 142, 143.
' Stephen, Pleading (Williston's ed. 1895) 343-344.
'' Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. i92o) 1981.
' Coke, Littleton,* 41 b.
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man.2 7 6  In these cases the distinction between derivative and non-
derivative titles was almost stretched to the breaking point for while the
title in the sense of the method of acquisition was non-derivative, it
must have been hard to say that the title acquired was a "brand-new"
one.2 7 7 It must have been commensurate with the old estate and have
had the same legal character as leasehold or freehold.
278
A new turn to the matter was given by the Real Property Limitation
Act of 1833 which expressly operated on the right as well as the remedy
and provided that on the running of the statute the right of the party
out of possession be extinguished 2 79 Sugden took this to mean that
the statute operated by way of extinguishment in the way that the old
release by the disseisee had operated so that the right ceased to exist
with respect to the releasor and passed to the releasee.28 0 Accordingly
he held that the statute operated as "a bar and . . . a transfer of the
estate."'281  Baron Parke took the same view.282 It would seem, how-
ever, that they were engrossed with the right gained rather than with
the method of gaining it and others refused to give to the statute the
positive effect of a conveyance. The latter view was taken by Lord
Esher in Wilkes v. Greenway283 and by Lord Esher and his associates
in Tichborne v. Weir"84 and this may be said to be the prevalent view
in England at the present time.285 It is difficult, however, to say how far
the case of Tichborne v. Weir goes. It was the case of a lease and of
one who, without a formal transfer, assumed the position of the lessee.
Upon the expiration of the term he was sued on the covenant to repair
and the court held that he was not liable. Bowen, L. J., however
admitted that the landlord never lost his right of re-entry 2 6 and Kay.
L. J., that the defendant had been entitled to the possession during the
remainder of the term.287 There is nothing to indicate that they con-
sidered the statute to have made impossible the acquisition of a particu-
lar estate under the circumstances indicated by Preston,28 and Light-
2282 Conveyancing (18o6) 314 et seq.; 2 Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 293.
raThe expression is Sweet's. Title by Adverse Possession (19o7) 19 JuRIu. REv.
67, 70.
' Darby and Bosanquet, Statute of Limitations (2d ed. 1893) 300.
Supra p. 146.
'This explanation of Sugden's views is given by Meredith, A Paradox of
Sugden's (1918) 34 LAw Q. REV. 253, 259, and seems convincing.
'Burrouglis v. McCreight (844) 7 Ir. Eq. 49, 54. The various statements of
Sugden to the same effect are reviewed by Meredith in the article cited supra note
28, and referred to by Sweet, Title by Adverse Possession (19o7) 18 JURID. REV.
416.
'Doe d. .ukes v. Sumner (1845, Exch.) i4 M. & W. 39, 42.
(189o, C. -A.) 34 SOL. JouR. 673.
(1892, C. A.) 67 L. T. 735.
ig Halsbury, Laws of England (1911) I55.
2267 L. T., at p. 737.
"'Ibid. at p. 738.
See supra p. 157.
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wood takes this for granted.2 9  Sweet thinks that "if the adverse
possessor had committed a breach of the covenants contained in the
lease, and the lessor had entered under the proviso for re-entry, it
is hard to believe that the court would have treated his entry as
unlawful."
29 0
Thus the 'matter stood until 1905 when in Re Nisbet and Potts' Con-
tract, Farwell, J., held that one who had gained the fee under the
statute was bound by equitable restrictions binding on the old owner
unless he were a purchaser without notice, 91 and this was affirmed by
the Court of Appeal.292  There is little wonder that Sweet considered
Tichborne v. Weir in effect overruled292 for it would seem in juris-
dictions like the United States where the burden of covenants run
against the fee at law, 294 that if equitable restrictions bind the adverse
possessor, covenants running at law should, 295 and if they should in the
case of the fee, why should they not in the case of the lease ?299 The
judges, however, did not profess to overrule Tichborne v. Weir but
placed their decision on the ground that the only rights extinguished for
the benefit of the adverse possessor were "those of persons who might,
during the statutory period, have brought, but did not in fact bring an
action to recover possession of the land."2 97  Only Farwell, J.,
attempted to distinguish the case from Tichborne v. Weir. They all
followed the opinion of Sir George Jessel in London and South West-
ern Ry. v. Gonlln,298 that an equitable restriction binds the land in
equity and considered it immaterial that the land might be in the hands
of one not in privity with the covenantor. In their opinion it was as if
the right concerned had been a legal easement except that in such a
case the matter of notice would have been immaterial.
Lightwood states Preston's position as good law (Possession, 271, 275) at the
same time that he cites Tichborne v. Weir with approval. Ibid. 273. And see his
Time Limit on Actions (19o9) 118, 119.
2"Op. cit. supra note 281, at p. 416.
[I905] 1 Ch. 391.
[I9O6, C. A.] i Ch. 386.
' Op. cit. su-pra note 290, at p. 418.
2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 14o5.
"'As to the desirability of certain covenants running against the land even in
the hands of adverse possessors see Holmes, Common Law (188) 404. But see
Clark, Privity of Estate (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 123, 139.
22Holmes considers the covenant to repair as the chief of those covenants
analogous to easements which he would make run with the land irrespective of
privity (ibid.) but, erroneously it would seem, says that the lease could not go by
disseisin. Lightwood, Time Limit on Actions (igog) 118, goes so far as to say
that "a person who acquires a title to a leasehold interest by possession takes
subject to all the incidents of the tenure other than liability under the covenants in
the lease." And see ibid. at p. 119.
"'Cozens-Hardy, [29o6] i Ch. 386, 410. See also the opinions of Collins,
M. R., ibid. 402, of Rome, L. J., ibid. 4o7, and of Farwell, J., [19o5] i Ch. 399."9' (1882) L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 562, 581.
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Whatever the theory of the statute, it is generally accepted that the
adverse possessor will take subject to legal burdens such as easements,
profits, rent charges, mortgages, conditions, conditional limitations
293
unless he can "shew extinguishment by abandonment or otherwise like
any other landowner."300  Because the statute is running against one
interest it does not follow that it is running against some other interest
and in the case of a contingent interest such as a conditional limitation it
would seem clear that it will not run until the contingency has happened
and the one entitled under the gift over has a right to the possession and
at any rate until he is ascertained.30' Probably the results in these
situations would not be very different under the American law of
adverse possessior. It must be confessed that here the doctrine of adverse
possession as affirmative prescription meets its hardest test. There is
so much of the remedy in evidence and so little of absolute title that we
are tempted to say that after all it is the loss of the action or the right
that is the primary thing and not the acquisition of thfe title. Nor is
this entirely answered by a resort to the common law notion of relativity
of title. To say that one can gain a title by adverse possession good
against B just as he may have his title adjudged good against B in an
action, without in either case having a title good against the whole
world, is to state the result in terms of substantive law but not to con-
ceal how largely procedural it is. It is a salutary reminder that how-
ever much adverse possession has gained for itself a place in the sub-
stantive law of property, it bears many marks of its remedial origin and
will probably continue to do so. The title gained by adverse possession
in such a case, however, relative though it may be, is something more
than a mere possessory title for it has upon it the stamp of the statute.
.A frequent case is where the adverse possession is under claim of fee
and against land divided into particular estate and remainder or rever-
sion. It is clear that in most jurisdictions the statute not only does
not commence to run against the remainderman or reversioner when
it does against the particular tenant but that, cases of disclaimer aside,
it does not commence to run against them until the natural termination
of the particular estate.0 2 This is hardly consistent with what was
said in Tichborne v. Weir, for if the effect of the statute was to anni-
hilate the interest of the person against whom the statute had run, the
particular estate would be wiped out and the remainderman and
reversioner would have an immediate right to possession and the statute
would commence to run against them immediately.303  This has led
writers like Darby and Bosanquet °4 to apply to this situation the rule
22 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 1g8o; Sweet, op. cit. supra note 290.
Farwell, J., [19o5] I Ch. 400.
" See Kales, Future Interests (2d ed. 192o) 395 as to cases involving contingent
remainders.
'Ibid. sec. 385; Sweet, op. cit. supra note 290.
3 Ibid.3 Statute of Limitations (2d ed. 1893) 39o.
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applicable where the adverse claim is directed only towards the particu-
lar estate 3 3 and to hold that the adverse possessor acquires an estate
commensurate in quality and duration to the successive estates into
which the land was divided. This view was adopted in the Irish case of
Rankin v. McMurtry.30 6  It is also the view of Mr. Kales, based on the
American authorities. 30 7  The distinction between this view and Sug-
den's that the statute "in effect transferred the estate to the person who
had the possession"308 is pretty fine and Sweet argues with great con-
viction that Sugden's view is the only one consistent with the English
statute.30 9 That the original particular estate is not destroyed is sup-
ported by Mr. Kales's opinion that contingent remainders dependent
upon it are not destroyed by the running of the statute against the
particular tenant. 310 The rule was contra in England311 but Mr. Kales
thinks it would be otherwise in the United States and this is believed
to be so although it is hard to support unless one believes that the new
particular estate that the adverse possessor has gained is the same one
that originally supported the remainder.
The difficulty with Sugden's view is that in the ordinary case nothing
'Supra p. 142.
"0, (1889) 24 L. R. Ir. 29o. See also Lightwood, Time Limit of Actions (19o9)
ii, where he definitely abandons the view expressed in his earlier work on
Possession, 274.
"'Future Interests (2d ed. 192o) secs. 386 and 396. But see 2 Tiffany, Real
Property (2d ed. 1920) 1982.
' Tuthill v. Rogers (1844, Ir. Ch.) i 'Jones & La. T. 36, 72.
' Op. cit. supra note 29o, at p. 416. Sugden does not seem to have been called
on to express an opinion as to the succession to limited estates under the statute
but there, if anywhere, would his views seem applicable.
"' Future Interests (2d ed. 192o) sec. 396.
" Kales cites Fearne, Contingent Remainders (gth ed. 1831) 287 and Butler's
note thereto for the well-settled rule of the old common law that a right of entry
would support a contingent remainder but that a right of action would not.
Fearne's explanation (p. 286) was that "whilst a right of entry remains there can
be no doubt but the same estate continues; since the right of entry can exist only
in consequence of the subsistence of the estate." This was an example of the old
notion that the right of entry was possessory while the right of action was not.
See Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rxv. 592, at p. 614. It
would have been logical, as Kales argues, for them to have held that with the
destruction of. the right of entry the remainderman would have been entitled to
possession but as the right of action still continued in the true tenant notwith-
standing the loss of his right of entry it is doubtful whether any such result would
have been held to follow. If the effect of the English statute of 1833 be entirely
negative and such as to destroy the right of the life tenant, the right of the
remainderman to enter would seem indubitable (see [1890] 34 So.. Joui. 691), but
as to this, Lightwood in his earlier work, Possession, at p. 213, admitted that
"probably it would not be deemed to have determined for all purposes, but to be in
effect transferred to the stranger in whose favor time has been running. In other
words, he gains a possessory estate pur auter sie." In his Time Limit of Actions
(19o) 58, he reaches a like result as to the non-acceleration of remainders but
avoids the admission that there is in such a case in effect a transfer of the life
estate.
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is more sharply contrasted than a conveyance on the one hand and
disseisin, the statute of limitations, and adverse possession on the other.
The typical example of a lack of privity of estate, whether in a case of
tacking, or of liability on covenants, or of liability as a trustee has been
that of disseisin, and the case of the adverse possessor before the
statute has run would seem to be in the ordinary case analogous in this
respect. Should the fact that the statute has run make any difference?
Ordinarily it would seem not, for though, as has been argued, Ameri-
can adverse possession is primarily affirmative, as a method of acquisi-
tion it would seem primarily original. But if in the situation that we
have been examining the remainders are not to be accelerated nor the
contingent remainders destroyed, the new life estate gained has so
many characteristics of the old that it is hard to express this in any
other way than Sugden did in general, that in such a case there is in
effect a transfer.
A less frequent but by no means unimportant case is where wrongful
possession is held for the whole or part of the statutory period by one
who claims a limited estate not previously existing. Here two situa-
tions may arise. Either the claim implies the existence of a fee incon-
sistent with the lawful fee or there is no such implication, as in the case
of the void lease. The latter case will be considered presently. There
are many possible variations of the former.
There may be an adverse possession initiated by A and a deed or a
will by A transferring the property to B for life, either with or without
a remainder to C in fee. Or A may die intestate and his wife enter a
part of the land as dowress for life. Or A may not have been an
adverse possessor but the possessor of a limited interest which ter-
minated with his death or he may have had neither possession nor right.
Or again, A may have been the owner and the deed or will invalid or
the description of the property insufficient. Such defect may also have
existed in the preceding cases where A did not have good title.
In these cases there is little difficulty in England with regard to the
old owner. The character in which or the intent with which the land
is held is of little importance in determining whether the statute has
run against him. If the wrongful possession of the particular tenant
has existed for the statutory period, barring future interests and dis-
abilities, his rights are cut off and if such possession has been for less
than the statutory period, it may be tacked with any other wrongful
possession provided there has not been a gap between them.
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In the United States, however, the matter of the old owner's rights
is not so simple. Though the claimant to the particular estate has been
in possession for the statutory period, the law will not give him a




old fee, while if he has been in possession for a shorter period, there is
the additional difficulty of tacking his possession under the claim of a
particular estate to that of his predecessor, or successor, or both, under
claim of a fee.3 14
But just as in the ordinary case, the particular tenant represents the
fee, so for purposes of adverse possession it would seem he should
represent the fee which his claim implies. Such representation is not
based on the relationship of landlord and tenant, or even that of tenure,
for there is no tenure between the life tenant and the remainderman, but
it is based on the integrity of the fee31 and this integrity should apply to.
the fee implied in the tenant's claim as well as any other. If this be so,
then the, claim of the particular tenant represents the claim of the fee
during the tenancy and there is no break in the claim of title, and we
have possession under the same claim of title for the statutory period,
which would seem to be an ample compliance with the requirement of
privity of estate in tacking.318 This representation of the fee would not
seem to be affected by the validity of the instrument under which the
particular estate is claimed nor by the fact that the land is not properly
described.
Where the completion of the statutory period is by the remainder-
man in fee the question of giving a man a greater estate than he claims
does not arise. It is generally agreed in the United States in such a
case that he can tack the possession of the particular tenant to his own,
or that in other words the possession of the tenant enures to the benefit
of the remainderman. 31 7 And there would seem to be no difference in
principle in such a case whether the adverse possession had been
initiated by the particular tenant or the one under whom he claimed to
hold.
Where the adverse possessor initiates and completes the adverse
holding the matter is more difficult, but it would seem that he represents
the fee implied in his claim as much as in the other cases and that here
too his possession should enure to the benefit of the remainderman, for
although there has been no act on the part of the remainderman show-
ing his acceptance of the fee as in the preceding cases there is not the
difficulty of presuming a wrong on his part as in the case of disseisin as,
if the reasoning of the foregoing pages has been correct, adverse pos-
session is in the nature of a positive title and the general presumption
of acceptance of property as under a deed or descent would apply.
21 Supra p. 7.
"'As to the integrity of the fee in a situation somewhat analogous, Littleton
says: "For to this intent the tenant for term of life and he in the remainder are
as one tenant in law, and are as if one tenant were sole seised in his demesne as of
fee at the time of such release made to him .... " Tenures, *471.
" See supra p. 4.
"'2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 197o.
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And such have been the decisions in the United States.31 s It is
submitted that they are correct.3 19
In England this question came up not between the de jure owner and
the claimants under the adverse possession, for there there was no
question but that the old owners' rights were gone, but between the
particular tenant or rather those claiming under him and the remainder-
man. This v'as putting the doctrine of representation to its most acid
test in the situation most unfavorable for it, and yet the logical conse-
quences of that doctrine were approved by judges such as Martin and
Pollock 20 and Blackburn and Mellor and Quain"'L and Lindley32 2 in
England, and by others in Ireland and Canada,3 2 3 likewise by Light-
wood.3 2 4  Unfortunately, in this connection Blackburn, J., used the
analogy of the estoppel between landlord and tenant3 25 and the great
powers of Sir George Jessel were called into play8 28 to deny that these
estoppels should be carried further than where the defect in the adverse
possessor's title was due to a defect in his grantor's title. If the fault
lay in the incapacity of the grantor, or the failure to include the land in
the instrument, or if for any other reason than the defect in his own title
the instrument was not sufficient to give good title to the land in ques-
tion, Sir George Jessel held that the principle of contractual estoppel
was inapplicable. Lindley, L. J., seemed to agree with Sir George
Jessel in this matter of estoppel3 7 but was not satisfied with the dis-
tinction drawn by Malins, V. C., in Paine v. Jones3 2 8 "between cases of
persons having no title under a will because it does not purport to
include the lands they claim although they believe that it does, and per-
'Hanson v. Johnson (2883) 62 Md. 25; Anderson v. Rhodus (i86o, S. C.) 12
Rich. Eq. 1o4; Brown v. Brown (1884) 82 Tenn. 253; Reynolds v. Trawick
(1918) 2oi Ala. 449, 78 So. 827. And see the note to Charles v. Pickens (i9o8)
214 MO. 212, 112 S. W. 55I, 24 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1055.
*" But see Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession (1919) 29 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 224-235; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 1984-1986.
In Anstee v. Nelms (1856, Exch.) i H. & N. 225.
' in Board v. Board (1882) L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 48. Blackburn, J. thought that
what Martin, B., had said in Anstee v. Nelins was "good sense and good law" and
the language of the other two judges indicated an equally broad doctrine. The
case was not one where the adverse possession was initiated by the creator of the
life estate for he was tenant by the curtesy so that no interest passed under his
will, but the will was a valid will and there was a sufficient description of the
property.
'Dalton v. Fitzgerald [1897, C. A.] 2 C. 86, 90.
I See Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 319, at p. 226.
'Possession, 284. In his later work (Time Limit of Actions [igog] i29)
however, Lightwood admits that the distinction made by Malins, V. C., in Paine v.
Jones (1874) L. R. 18 Eq. 32o, discussed infra p. 298, "must at present be taken
to be established by authority."
'Board v. Board, supra note 321, at p. 53.
**In re Stringer's Estate (1877) L. R. 6 Ch. Div. I, 9.
'n Dalton v. Fitzgerald, supra note 322, at p. 91.
I Supra note 324.
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sons claiming under a will which purports to deal with land to which
the testator had no title although they thought he had.13 29 How far the
distinction drawn by Malins, V. C., in Paine v. Jones is destined
to survive in England is a matter for the future to determine. 30 It
is not believed that it is likely to have much effect in the United
States, for though estoppel has been mentioned by some of the Ameri-
can judges the solid ground for their opinions has been iepresentation,
and it matters little that what they have said on estoppel may not meet
with approval.
33'
There remains the case of the one holding for the statutory period
under a void lease. If, as seems generally agreed, a particular estate
can be gained by adverse possession where such an estate is already in
existence and is claimed by the adverse possessor, 332 and if, as has just
been shown, an entirely original particular estate can be created by
adverse possession, where the particular tenant represents' the fee
claimed, why should the courts not go one step further and hold that
where one enters under color of a lease and holds for the statutory
period he gains a- lease commensurate with the one claimed? It is
believed that the Mississippi cases which so hold333 will and should have
an extensive following. It would seem to be the logical consequence of





It is not the purpose here to go into the analysis of ownership and
possession. They were quite distinct in the Roman law,3 U they were
quite distinct to Bracton,330 they are constantly contrasted in the utter-
m Dalton v. Fitzgerald supra note 322, at p. 91.
'In re Anderson [1905] 2 Ch. 7o, was not a case where there was a defect in
the divisor's title nor an inadequate description but the case of a void will, and
Buckley, J., followed Paine v. Jones on the ground that while the authority of that
case was considerably shaken by the opinion of Lord Lindley, he did not think the
latter intended to throw doubt on a case of this kind. In re Tennent's Estate [i913,
Ir. Ch.] I Ir. 28o was similar to In re Anderson and a like result reached.
m It is urged by Professor Ballantine that the English distinction be adopted in
the United States, not on the ground of estoppel but on the ground of a common
source of title (op. cit. supra note 319, at pp. 224, 225, 235) but he would deny the
enurement of the particular tenant's possession to the benefit of the remainderman
even in a case like Dalton v. Fitzgerald (ibid. at p. 232). His emphasis on the
adverse possession or at least the possession of the grantor would seem a relic of
the time when possession was necessary to a transfer.
Supra p. 293.




'See Ulpian's statement Nihil commune habet possessio cum proprietate, Dig.
41. 2. 12. I.
Fol. 113. Bracton adopts Ulpian's statement as his own. See Maitland, The
Mystery of Seisin (x886) 2 LAw Q. REV. 481 and 2 Pollock and Maitland,
History of the English Law (2d ed. 1899) 78.
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ances of the courts, in the works of jurists and in the everyday life of
the lawyer and the layman. Possession on the one hand and proprie-
tary right on the other represent two very distinct ideas. But as it
happened, the remedies of the common law that emphasized proprietary
right sunk into the background, 3 7 the writs of entry came to be consid-
ered possessory,M38 and finally in the action of ejectment, the record of
the case showed nothing of the real merits of the case and the failure
to succeed with one action by no means precluded one from beginning
another. Where one succeeded, as where one entered on the land pro-
vided his entry was lawful, he was in as of his lawful estate but that he
had such lawful estate was not res adjudicata even between the
parties.339 What strikes us with wonder is that this rough and ready
remedy should have been as satisfactory as it was, but it is no more sur-
prising than that such an intense protection of property in chattels as
was and still is given by the common law could have been effected by
means of an action for damages34 0 or that a most effective system
of property law could have been developed in equity through a
remedy that acted immediately only on the person. In the reaction
against natural law and natural rights there was a tendency in the last
century to exalt the remedy and to see the law in terms of the remedy
rather than to see through the remedy to the more fundamental thing
beyond. Thus the right of the cestui was viewed in the light of a per-
sonal obligation and one who had lost his chattel was said to have a
mere right to damages. In the case of land it was said that the law
knew no such thing as ownership, but knew a mere right of possession.
And yet it was the looking at the more fundamental thing behind that
was the cause of the development of our law, the notion that where
there was a right there should be a remedy, although this was often in
the guise of fictions that obscured the real process. Of no part of the
law was this more true, it is believed, than of the law of possession and
proprietary right.
Possession probably held the field during the Middle Ages under the
name of seisin, although this was only by means of stretching the con-
ception of seisin to the breaking point, 1 but equity came to the aid of
proprietary right and finally the Statute of Uses turned the scale in
favor of proprietary right, although only on the condition that it should
masquerade as seisin. 42 Seisin thus became a tertium quid, a mys-
tery,343 and the disseisor a sort of owner for the time being. In time his
The Writs of Right had seen their best days in the time of Edward I. Mait-
land, 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 336, at p. 7L
Ibid. at p. 72.
Sedgwick and Wait, Trial of Title to Land (2d ed. 1886) sec. 42.
"* See 2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 336, at p. x54.
U Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin (1921) 34 HAmv. L. REv. 592, 593.
'" Ibid. at p. 598.
2"Maitland, Mystery of Seisin (1886) 2 LAw Q. REv. 481; Sweet, Title by
Adverse Possession (i9o7) ig Jua-D. REv. 66.
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seisin might become indefeasible but this was the best the old law could
offer him. The reform legislation of 1833 eliminated disseisin from
the law of actions, but although Sugden and Baron Parke attempted to
give it the positive effect of a conveyance, it was negative in its language
and the prevalent view of its effect at the present time seems to be that
for a indefeasible seisin it has substituted an indefeasible possession.
3 "
This view Ames adopted as applicable generally.
345 Despite this and
the currency that Blackstone might have been expected to give to such
a view, it would seem to have had little place in the United States.
Entry and ouster ceased to be principal facts in the English law with
the passage of the Statute of Uses and the development of ejectment."
6
Possession came to follow the right rather than the right the posses-
sion,3 47 and this was carried to its logical conclusion in the United
States by holding that the owner had possession unless the land was in
the adverse possession of another.
3 4s This had long before been the
rule for chattels in England.3 49 And when there was a break in the
adverse possession the American courts held that the possession
derived from ownership reasserted itself without entry.
350 On the
adoption of this view in England 5' Lightwood was frank to recognize
its significance as substituting ownership and possession for the old
seisin.3 52
The feeling, often unconscious, of the fundamental difference
between possession and even adverse possession on the one hand and
proprietary right or ownership on the other is illustrated by the state-
ment sometimes made that the title gained by adverse possession relates
back to the beginning of the adverse possession.
s 53 This is not dis-
seisin, for the disseisor's title such as it is exists from the beginning and
the only effect of the statute is to make it indefeasible. It is an analogy
drawn from the law of conversion and it is only where there is a sharp
distinction between possession and proprietary right as there is in the
case of chattels, that there can be any place for such relation. It mat-
ters not for the purpose of this illustration that the theory of the title
relating back would seem to have no place in the law of adverse posses-
3" 19 Halsbury, Laws of England (191i) 55 and see the statement of Lord
Macnaghten, Perry v. Clissold [,9o7, P. C.] A. C. 72, 79.
*3 Select Essays, 567-578.
' Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 341, at p. 6oi.
247 Ibid. 604.
" Supra p. io.
'"Hudson v. Hudson (1628, K. B.) Latch, 214, 263; Bordwell, Property in




'Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession (919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 135, 142;
Kales, Future Interests (2d ed. 192o) sec. 392; 2 C. J. 254.
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sion. 5' There is no such theory of election in adverse possession as
there is in conversion to call the fiction into play and even in the case
of conversion it would seem extremely artificial. 35 5 There would seem
to be no call for its extension.
Finally the extended treatment of adverse possession in the modern
American texts is a standing answer to the adequacy of any theory of
possession plus the statutes of limitation to explain the American law.
If Sugden's view of the English statute operating as a conveyance is not
to be accepted in England, some such view as that of defeasible posses-
sion must take its place. But there is no such necessity in the United
States for, as has been argued in these pages, we have a doctrine of
affirmative prescription and much of the criticism of our law has
resulted from failing to recognize that fact, but instead of insisting on
applying to our law the criteria of the negative prescription of the
English law. Which is the better ystem may be matter of argument.
The English has many advantages in cutting off stale claims. Ours is
more logical from the point of view of quieting titles. But whether we
prefer the one system or the other, it will tend to enlighten rather than
to confuse, to have a clear understanding of what the two systems are.
CONCLUSION
The theory that we adopted such of the English common law as was
suited to our condition has often in practice been taken to mean that we
adopted such of the English law as we did not definitely reject. It is
assumed that all sorts of English rules are part of our law although the
only authority for them are the English cases and in many instances
very old English cases at that. Law that does not find its way into the
cases over a long period of time and in our many jurisdictions, however,
cannot be very live law and one of the crying needs of our times is to
determine what is live law and what is not. But where we -have defi-
nitely rejected the old law and substituted something different and per-
haps better in its place, it would seem to be lacking in proper pride to
ignore it and go on judging the living present by the discarded past.
Perhaps this has not been the case in other branches of the law to the
same extent that it has been true in the law of adverse possession, but it
will not do to assume this and it is believed that in other branches of the
law as well constructive legal work of the greatest value has been done
by the American judiciary. The harvest truly is plenteous but the
laborers are few.
' See La Salle Coal Co. v. Sanitary District (1913) 260 Ill. 423, 430, 13o N. E.
175, 177.
In Miller v. Hyde (1894) 161 Mass. 472, 481, 37 N. E. 760, 763, Holmes, J.,
refers to "the otherwise unexplained notion that when execution is satisfied the
title of the defendant relates back to the date of the conversion."
